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That the City Manager be and hereby is requested to work with the Police Department to provide information to the City Council about social media protocols and what disciplinary action has been taken as result of the Department’s social media use incident. CHARTER RIGHT EXERCISED BY COUNCILLOR SIMMONS IN COUNCIL MAY 11, 2020
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Assistant City Solicitors
Nancy E. Glowa
Paul S. Kawai
City Solicitor
INSTIEVES
Keplin K. U. Allwaters
Arthur J. Goldberg
Sean M. McKendry
Megan B. Bayer
Deputy City Solicitor
Brian A. Schwartz
Katherine Sarmini Hoffman
Samuel A. Aylesworth
First Assistant City Solicitor
Public Records Access Officer
Seah Levy
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
Office of the City Solicitor
795 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
May 18, 2020
Louis A. DePasquale
City Manager
City Hall, 795 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Re: Response to Council Order No. O-4 of 5/11/20 Requesting Information on
What Disciplinary Action Has Been Taken in Response to a Sunday, May 3,
2020 Tweet by Cambridge Police Superintendent Jack Albert
Dear Mr. DePasquale:
1. INTRODUCTION
This legal opinion is submitted in response to Order No. O-4 of May 11, 2020 requesting
information on what disciplinary action has been taken in response to a Sunday, May 3, 2020
Tweet by Cambridge Police Superintendent Jack Albert' on the official Twitter account of the
.. another liberal [expletive] jerk
City of Cambridge (the "City") Police Department stating "•
who happens to better [sic] than the clown he's running against. ...." As noted below, I am of
the opinion that the details of any disciplinary action which may have been taken against
Superintendent Albert constitutes "personnel ... files or information; also any other materials or
data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" pursuant to G. L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c), are "absolutely
exempt from disclosure," and may not be disclosed to the City Council, including in an executive
session of the City Council.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
'Because Superintendent Albert identified himself via name publicly in an apology issued on May 4, 2020,
we have included his name in this legal opinion. If Superintendent Albert did not publicly identify himself,
he would not have been identified in this legal opinion. Wakefield Teachers Assn. v. School Committee of
Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 800 (2000).
Facsimile [phone removed]
Telephone [phone removed]
TTY/TTD [phone removed]
A. The City Manager is the Appointing Authority of All Members of the Cambridge
Police Department
Under the City's Plan E Charter, "the government of the City and the general
management and control of all its affairs shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, be
vested in a City Council, which shall exercise its powers in the manner hereinafter set forth...
except that the City Manager shall have the authority hereinafter specified." G. L. c. 43, § 95. In
addition, under the City's Charter "the City Council shall have and exercise all the legislative
powers of the City, except as such powers are reserved by this chapter to the School Committee
and to the qualified voters of the City." G. L. c. 43, § 97. Furthermore, under the Charter, the
City Manager "... shall make all appointments and removals in the departments, commissions,
boards and offices of the City for whose administration he is responsible, except as otherwise
provided in this chapter. ..." G. L. c. 43, § 104. Moreover, G. L. c. 43, § 107 provides that
"neither the City Council nor any of its committees or members shall direct or request the
appointment of any person to, or his removal from, office by the City Manager or any of his
subordinates, or in any manner take part in the appointment or removal of officers and
employees in that portion of the service of said City for whose administration the City Manager
is responsible" and "except for the purpose of inquiry, the city council and its members shall deal
with that portion of the service of the City as aforesaid solely through the City Manager, and
neither the City Council nor any member thereof shall give orders to any subordinate of the City
Manager either publicly or privately." G. L. c. 43, § 107.
Under Chapter 2.52, Section 2.52.010 of the Municipal Code: "the Police Department
shall be under the charge of a Police Commissioner who shall be the head of the Department and
who shall, from time to time, make suitable regulations governing the Department and the
officers thereof, subject to the approval of the City Manager." Given that the City Manager is
the appointing authority of the Police Commissioner and his subordinates, and the Police
Department is a department for whose administration the City Manager is responsible, any
discipline concerning employees in the Police Department, is within the purview of the City
Manager and the Police Commissioner, and as explained in more detail below, is exempt from
public disclosure under G. L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c). To the extent that G. L. c. 43, § 107 provides the
City Council any authority to make inquiry of City personnel, that inquiry is limited to matters
within the City Council's jurisdiction, and not inquiry into employee-specific disciplinary
decisions, as explained further below. G. L. c. 43, § 107.
B. Personnel Records Are Exempt from Disclosure Under the Massachusetts Public
Records Law
G. L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c) exempts from public disclosure "personnel and medical files or
information; also, any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the
disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." See G. L. c. 4,
§ 7 cl. 26(c). The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has long held
that the personnel records of government employees are exempt from public disclosure. In
Wakefield Teachers Association v. School Committee of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, (2000), the
Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a disciplinary decision and report of the
superintendent of Wakefield public schools regarding the performance of a Wakefield public
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school teacher is exempt from disclosure under the public records law, G.L. c. 66, § 10, pursuant
to G.L. c. 4, § 7, 26(c). Wakefield Teachers Association, 431 Mass. at 792—793. By way of
background, sometime before March of 1995, the Superintendent of Wakefield Public Schools
learned that a male teacher at Wakefield Junior High School had written potentially
inappropriate notes on the homework assignments of two female students in his class. Id. at 794.
The Superintendent conducted an investigation into the allegations, including an interview with
the teacher and two union representatives, and wrote a report. Id. His report described his
decision to impose on the teacher a suspension without pay for four weeks. Id. Thereafter, a
resident of Wakefield wrote to the Superintendent requesting information regarding the
suspension of a teacher at Wakefield Junior High School through a public records request, noting
that he was not interested in the name of the teacher or any student involved, but rather, the
nature of the offense for which he was suspended. Id. at 795.
The Superintendent denied the request; however, the Supervisor of Public Records
opined that "those portions of the records which identify the suspended teacher and relate to his
alleged misconduct are subject to mandatory disclosure upon request," and litigation in the
Superior Court and subsequent appeals followed. Id. at 796. The Supreme Judicial Court held
that "the report at issue in this case pertains to one teacher only and is absolutely exempt from
disclosure under the plain language of the statute." Id. at 800 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Judicial Court also noted that in enacting G. L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c), the Legislature clearly balanced
competing public policy considerations, that the exemption of personnel files and information
has, among other benefits, the protection of the government's ability to function effectively as an
employer, and that were the teacher involved to be concerned that his cooperation with an
investigation would result in public disclosure, his cooperation might not have been forthcoming.
Id. at 802. Therefore, as a matter of law, the personnel records of an employee are exempt from
disclosure under the Public Records Law.
In a case involving an internal affairs investigation file of the Worcester Police
Department, the Appeals Court drew a distinction between the facts in Waketield Teachers
Association and those in Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corporation v. Chief of Police of
Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (2003). Worcester Telegram & Gazette, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at
8-9. In that case, the Worcester Telegram & Gazette through a public records request sought
an internal affairs investigation file from the Worcester Police Department; the investigation file
contained materials compiled during an investigation of a citizen complaint following a May 1,
1999 incident. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 2. The Appeals Court held:
"we conclude that materials in an internal affairs investigation are different in kind from the
ordinary evaluations, performance assessments and disciplinary determinations encompassed in
the public records exemption for "personnel [file] or information,' the sole exemption at issue."
Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Appeals Court reasoned that "an internal affairs investigation
is a formalized citizen complaint procedure, separate and independent from ordinary
employment evaluation and assessment." Id. at 7. "Unlike other evaluations and assessments,
the internal affairs process exists specifically to address complaints of police corruption (theft,
bribery, acceptance of gratuities), misconduct (verbal and physical abuse, unlawful arrest,
harassment), and other criminal acts that would undermine the relationship of trust and
confidence between the police and the citizenry that is essential to law enforcement." Id. In
reaching its conclusion, the Appeals Court reasoned: "we consider the officers' reports, the
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witness interview summaries, and the internal affairs report itself to be substantially different
from the single, integrated report held to be 'personnel [file] or information' in Wakefield."
Worcester Telegram & Gazette, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 7.
Indeed, in conformity with the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Wakefield Teachers
Association, the Appeals Court found in Worcester Telegram & Gazette that a memorandum
from the Worcester Chief of Police to the police officer in question detailing the findings of the
internal affairs investigation and the conclusion that no disciplinary action was to be taken, does
constitute a personnel record and is exempt from public disclosure. Id. at 9. In reaching that
conclusion as to the memorandum from the Chief of Police to the employee, the Appeals Court
reasoned that that document is a notice from the disciplining authority to the particular employee
advising of the disciplinary decision (that disciplinary action was not warranted) and that the
nature and character of this document makes it part of "the core category of personnel
information that is useful in making employment decisions regarding the employee" and is thus
exempt from public disclosure. Id
C. Employees' Rights Under the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law (G. L. c. 30A, SS
18—25)
Under G. L. c. 30A, § 18, a "meeting" is defined in part as "... a deliberation by a public
body with respect to any matter within the body's jurisdiction...." G. L. c. 30A, § 18; see also
Massachusetts Attorney General's "Open Meeting Law Guide & Education Materials," January
2018. Therefore, in order for the City Council to convene a meeting to inquire into what
discipline may have been issued to a City employee, the employee in question must be someone
within the City Council's jurisdiction. As outlined above, the City Manager is the appointing
authority for the Police Commissioner and his subordinates in the Police Department under the
Charter and Chapter 2.52, Section 2.52.010 of the Municipal Code, and therefore, disciplinary
matters pertaining to employees in the Police Department are not within the City Council's
jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that disciplinary matters of appointees of the City Manager are not
within the jurisdiction of the City Council, to the extent the City Council may elect to meet in
executive session for the purpose of discussing "the reputation, character ... rather than
professional competence, of an individual, or to discuss the discipline or dismissal of, or
complaints or charges brought against, a public officer, employee, staff member or individual"
who is an appointee of the City Council, and therefore, within the City Council's jurisdiction, the
employee discussed in such an executive session must be notified in writing by the City Council
at least forty-eight hours prior to the proposed executive session, unless waived by written
agreement of the City Council and the employee. G. L. c. 30A, § 21. Furthermore, the
individual being discussed has the right to be present during the executive session, to have legal
counsel or a representative of his choosing present for the purpose of advising the individual, to
speak on his own behalf during the executive session, and to cause an independent record of the
executive session to be created by audio or transcription at his own expense. Id. However, as
explained in detail above, because disciplinary matters constitute personnel records and the
'The City Council may hold an open session, rather than an executive session, if the individual involved requests
that the session be open. G. L. c. 30A, § 21.
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employee in question here is appointed by the City Manager and not appointed by the City
Council, any discussion of potential discipline of such an employee appointed by the City
Manager would not be within the City Council's jurisdiction and is therefore impermissible.
Moreover, in interpreting the provisions of G. L. c 43, S§ 104—105, the Supreme
Judicial Court has stated that "... weight must be given to the principle that strong terms are
required to show a legislative intent to supersede by a general act a special act which may be
made in regard to a place, growing out of its peculiar wants, condition, and circumstances" and
that "City charters are essentially [such] special enactments designed to provide for the particular
needs of the various cities." Welch v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 343 Mass. 502,
507 (1962) citing Haffner v. Director of Pub. Safety of Lawrence, 329 Mass. 709, 714 (1953).
Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Welch provides that the provisions of the
City's Charter, G. L. c. 43, 8§ 104, 105 et seq., which is a special act made with respect to the
City, shall not be superseded by any provisions in a later enacted general law, such as the Open
Meeting Law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18—25. Id. That issue is not relevant, however, because
although G. L. c. 30A, § 21 provides a mechanism whereby the City Council may convene an
executive session for the purpose of discussing discipline of an individual under the City
Council's jurisdiction, the City's Charter prohibits the City Council from discussing discipline of
an employee who is appointed by the City Manager, and furthermore, as noted above, under G.
L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c), the details of any discipline concerning a government employee are
absolutely exempt from disclosure.
III. CONCLUSION
Because employee discipline is the type of information the Supreme Judicial Court has
held is "absolutely exempt" from public disclosure under G. L. c. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c), information
concerning discipline of any City employees under the City Manager's jurisdiction may not be
disclosed to the City Council, including in an executive session of the City Council. Moreover,
because the City Manager is the appointing authority of all members of the Cambridge Police
Department, the provisions of the City's Charter as well as the Open Meeting Law dictate that
the City Council may not discuss discipline concerning any such employee, including in
executive session, since such discipline does not relate to employees within the City Council's
jurisdiction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please let me know.
Very truly yours,
Nancy E. Glowa
City Solicitor
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